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This paper broadens the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by
incorporating the Krugman–Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, given its importance
in explaining the prevalence of intraindustry trade. Several new results arise in this paper. First, the
endogenous import tariff will never fall below zero, even in unorganized sectors. Second, the
endogenous export policy for organized sectors is not necessarily an export subsidy, and can be an
export tax as in unorganized sectors. Third, the level of import protection varies inversely with the
degree of import penetration, regardless of whether the sector is organized or not.
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1. Introduction
Previous contributions to the literature of endogenous trade policy have proposed
various theories of political economy to predict the pattern of trade protection. Rodrik
(1995) provides a comprehensive survey of this literature. While these prior studies differ
in their formulation of the political processes that determine the trade policies,2 they
invariably adopt economic structures with perfect competition and homogeneous goods.3
The perfect competition assumption is a natural starting point that allows these models to
focus on the political processes. However, applying such models to empirical
investigations may not be adequate if the industries of the economy under study are far
from perfectly competitive. In practice, trade in developed countries is characterized by a
large proportion of intraindustry trade, as documented in Helpman (1999). For example,
the share of intraindustry trade was 84.6% in the United Kingdom, and 72.2% in Germany,
for the year of 1990. Intraindustry trade has generally been considered to be best explained
by monopolistic competition in differentiated goods, as captured by the Krugman–Dixit–
Stiglitz framework. Recent generalizations of this framework by Melitz (2003) further
show that monopolistic competition models prove very helpful in understanding the
microstructure of international trade.
This paper attempts to broaden the current theoretical literature on endogenous trade
policy by incorporating monopolistic competition, given its importance in explaining the
prevalence of intraindustry trade. This is accomplished by combining the Krugman–Dixit–
Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework with the protection for sale model of
Grossman and Helpman (1994) (henceforth G–H). Explicit formulas are derived for
endogenous import and export policies, whose components can be decomposed into the
workings of political economy and monopolistic competition. This paper thus provides a
generalized framework for empirical investigations of political influence on trade policies,
taking into account the presence of intraindustry trade.4
The endogenous protection patterns under monopolistic competition differ from those
of G–H in a few key aspects. First, the endogenous optimal import policy is always a tariff,
regardless of whether a sector is organized or not. This is contrary to the G–H finding
where unorganized import-competing sectors will face import subsidies (i.e., negative
protection). The difference arises from the fact that the welfare-maximizing import policy
(for an economy as a whole) is a positive import tariff for monopolistically competitive
2 See, for example, the median-voter model of Mayer (1984) and the political-contribution model of Grossman
and Helpman (1994).
3 For example, the Heckscher–Ohlin model is used in Magee et al. (1989) and Mayer (1984), while the
Ricardo–Viner model is used in Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Hillman (1982), and Grossman and Helpman (1994).
4 Grossman and Helpman (1995) present another framework where the endogenous protection pattern can be
decomposed into political motives and economic motives for trade intervention, when countries set tariffs
unilaterally. The economic incentive for trade intervention in Grossman and Helpman (1995) is rooted in the
terms-of-trade gain attained by large countries with perfectly competitive industries. On the other hand, the
economic incentive for trade intervention in the current paper arises from monopolistic competition that
characterizes the industries of a small country. It is an empirical issue which of these two models will better
explain observed protection patterns. Naturally, this depends on the characteristic of the country under study and
its production and trade structure.
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industries.5 The lobbies of organized sectors then bid for higher protection than the
welfare-maximizing levels for their own sectors. On the other hand, lobbies are interested
in the import policy of other sectors only as consumers. Since under monopolistic
competition, the consumer does not gain from deviations from zero restrictions on imports,
lobby groups actually prefer zero import tariffs for unorganized sectors. Thus, the resulting
endogenous import tariff for unorganized sectors, with both general interest and special
interest considered, cannot fall below zero.
Second, in the current framework, the endogenous export policy for organized sectors
is not necessarily an export subsidy, and can be an export tax as in unorganized sectors.
This deviates from the G–H result, where organized export sectors always receive export
subsidies and unorganized export sectors always receive export taxes. The intuition is that
the export policy does not affect the domestic consumer surplus in the current setup.
Starting with zero restrictions on exports, the tax revenue consideration outweighs the
profit consideration in the aggregate. Thus, the welfare maximizing export policy is an
export tax. The influence of special interests then pushes for higher taxes on exports of
unorganized sectors, compared to the welfare-maximizing levels, since the lobbies have no
claims to the profit of unorganized sectors. On the other hand, the lobbies collectively will
bid for lower taxes on exports of organized sectors, compared to the welfare-maximizing
levels. Whether the endogenous export policy for organized sectors will be an export tax
or export subsidy depends on the strength of the revenue consideration relative to the profit
consideration by the lobbies and the government. An export subsidy is likely to emerge in
organized sectors, if the lobbies are a small fraction of the total population, so that the
revenue consideration is less important, and the government is strongly biased toward
special interests.6
One implication of the G–H model that is of interest to empirical researchers is the
relationship between import protection and import penetration of a sector. The G–H model
predicts that organized sectors with lower import penetration will receive higher
protection, while unorganized sectors with higher import penetration will receive higher
protection (or more precisely, less negative protection). In the current study, however, a
sector with lower import penetration will receive higher protection, regardless of whether
the sector is organized or not. This difference in findings may be reconciled by the fact that
both organized and unorganized sectors are protected by import tariffs in the current study.
In this case, the effect of the size of the domestic industry is similar to that in G–H for
organized industries, which receive positive tariffs. In sectors with a larger presence of
domestic firms, the gain in profits from import tariffs is relatively larger, while the loss in
consumer surplus net of tariff revenue is relatively smaller. This leads to higher levels of
tariff protection for sectors with lower import penetration. Readers familiar with the
empirical literature on the structure of protection might immediately recognize the
5 This is consistent with the findings of Gros (1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987).
6 It is interesting to note that an analogous finding, although for different reasons, is contained in Grossman and
Helpman (1995), where an organized export sector may receive either an export tax or an export subsidy. In their
paper, the special interest in an export subsidy for an organized sector clashes with the general interest in an
export tax, which improves the countryTs terms of trade. An export subsidy emerges if the terms-of-trade loss due
to the subsidy is outweighed by the gain to special interests.
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disagreement between this theoretical prediction and previous empirical findings.
However, given that previous empirical findings are often either derived from ad hoc
regression models without theoretical underpinnings or are based on the G–H model
assuming perfect competition, they do not constitute direct evidence against the current
study. The results of the current paper suggest that the predictions of the G–H-type model
in this regard will depend on the nature of the industry (competitive versus
monopolistically competitive), and a correctly specified empirical model relating to the
G–H model should allow for heterogeneous responses of protection to import penetration
across different market structures. This has not been considered in previous cross-sectional
G–H-type empirical work.7
In spite of the differences discussed above, some general features of the G–H model
remain valid in the current setup with monopolistic competition. Once we adjust for the
differences in the welfare-maximizing levels of trade interventions between the current
paper and the G–H model, the equilibrium structure of protection under monopolistic
competition compares closely with that of G–H. The political parameters such as an
industry’s state of political organization, a country’s overall fraction of population
represented by lobbies, and a government’s relative weight on aggregate welfare versus
lobby contributions, all have similar effects in promoting or depressing the protection level
in an industry. Under both economic structures, the protection levels are higher for
organized sectors, and lower for unorganized sectors, than the benchmark welfare-
maximizing levels. As the government places more weight on aggregate welfare relative to
campaign contributions, the endogenous protection levels in both organized and
unorganized sectors converge toward the benchmark welfare-maximizing levels.
Furthermore, as the fraction of population that belongs to a lobby group increases, the
protection levels in all sectors decrease.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the economic structure
of the model within the G–H political framework. Section 3 derives the formulas for the
equilibrium structure of protection and discusses their implications. Concluding remarks
are collected in Section 4.
2. The economic framework
Suppose that a country is populated by individuals with identical preferences but
different factor endowments. Each individual maximizes the quasi-linear utility function
given by:
U ¼ X0 þ
Xn
i¼1
Ui Xið Þ ð1Þ
where X0 is the consumption of homogeneous good 0 and Xi is an index of consumption
of differentiated goods in industry i, i=1, 2,. . ., n. It is assumed that Xi takes the usual
7 See, for example, Eicher and Osang (2002), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) for their empirical investigations of the G–H model.
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Dixit–Stiglitz form of a constant elasticity of substitution function (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977):
Xi ¼
 Xmi
k¼1
x
qi
hi;k þ
Xmi4
k¼1
x
qi
f i;k
 1
qi
0bqib1 ð2Þ
where xhi,k (xfi,k) is the consumption of domestic (foreign) variety k of good i and mi (mi*)
is the number of varieties of good i produced at home (abroad). We focus on the scenarizo
where mi,mi*p0. The homogeneous good is taken as numeraire, with a world and domestic
price equal to one. The price index for differentiated good Xi is:
Pi ¼
 Xmi
k¼1
p
1ri
hi;k þ
Xmi4
k¼1
p
1ri
f i;k
 1
1ri ð3Þ
where phi,k ( pfi,k) is the consumer price at home for domestic (foreign) variety k
of good i and ri ¼ 11qi N1 is the elasticity of substitution among different varieties
of good i. Therefore, an individual with an income of E maximizes Eq. (1) given the
budget constraint X0 þ
Pn
i¼1 PiXi ¼ E. For simplicity, Ui is assumed to take the form of
Ei lnXi, which amounts to assuming that an individual allocates a fixed amount
of expenditure Ei for good i.
8 The rest of the world is assumed to share the same
preference structure, but with a possibly different allocation of expenditure on various
goods (Ei*).
The homogeneous good is assumed to be produced both at home and abroad, and is
manufactured from labor alone with constant returns to scale and a unit labor
requirement equal to one. Since it is traded freely and costlessly, the wage is equal to
one universally. Production of the differentiated goods requires labor and a sector-
specific input. Each variety of the differentiated good i is assumed to require a fixed
amount of the sector-specific factor ki in order to produce at all; after that, there is a
constant unit labor requirement of ci. Assume that there are a large number of varieties
(home and foreign combined) available to the consumer. Then given the preferences
specified above, each variety’s producer faces an approximately constant elasticity of
demand, equal to ri. With profit maximization, each domestic variety’s producer charges
the same price:
phi;k ¼ phi ¼ ciriri  1 : ð4Þ
The sector-specific factors in this country are assumed to be available in inelastic
supply (K¯i, i=1, 2,. . ., n). Therefore, the size of a differentiated-good industry in a country
is predetermined by the amount of the sector-specific factor that the country is endowed
with. The number of varieties produced at home in industry i would be mi=K¯i/ki. With this
8 To see this, note that by the first-order condition, it holds that 1 ¼ BU
BX0
¼ k. Similarly, Ei
Xi
¼ BU
BXi
¼ kPi. It
follows that Ei=PiXi.
P.-L. Chang / Journal of International Economics 66 (2005) 509–526 513
restriction on the number of firms in a sector, the rewards to the sector-specific input
adjust to absorb the operating surplus of firms, that is, the difference between their
revenues and their variable wage costs. This profit earned by the owners of the sector-
specific input increases with the output of the industry. Thus, the owners of the sector-
specific input in each sector have incentives to form a lobby group to promote their
interests if they can overcome the free-rider problem. The presence of sector-specific
profits is necessary for the G–H political framework, as the sector-specific lobby groups
need to spend financial resources and make political contributions to the government
policy maker. In a more usual monopolistic competition setting with broad-based
production factors and with free entry of firms so that firms retain zero profits, it is
difficult to justify the formation of sector-specific lobby interests.
The technology abroad to produce the differentiated products is assumed to be the same
as that at home. Therefore, it follows that pfi,k* =pfi*=phi, where pfi,k* is the consumer (and
producer) price at the foreign market for foreign variety k of good i. In this setup, the
presence of the homogeneous good ties down the relative producer prices of the home and
foreign varieties in a given differentiated-good industry, and hence eliminates possible
terms of trade effects from trade policies.9 Suppose the foreign country is endowed with a
stock of the sector-specific factor in the amount of K¯i*, for i=1, 2,. . ., n. Then, the number
of varieties produced abroad in industry i is mi*=K¯i*/ki. Following Flam and Helpman
(1987), we can regard the home country in our model as a small country, because it cannot
influence the foreign spending on differentiated goods (Ei*), the number of foreign
varieties of differentiated goods (mi*), and the foreign producer price of differentiated
goods ( pfi*).
Let the domestic import policy si denote one plus the ad valorem import tariff rate and
the domestic export policy si represent one plus the ad valorem export subsidy rate for
industry i. By this definition, a policy siN1 (sib1) corresponds to an import tariff
(subsidy), while a policy siN1 (sib1) corresponds to an export subsidy (tax). Similarly, let
si* and si* represent the corresponding foreign import and export policy for industry i,
defined in a similar way. Since the producer prices of the home and foreign varieties are
the same in a given industry, any difference in the consumer prices of the home and
foreign varieties at the domestic market reflects the government interventions in trade.
That is,
pf i;k ¼ pf i ¼ si
si4
phi si; si4N0: ð5Þ
Using Eqs. (4) and (5), we can simplify the price index for the differentiated good i in
Eq. (3) as:
Pi ¼ phi

mi þ mi4

si
si4
1ri 11ri
: ð6Þ
We can solve the utility optimization problem in two stages. In the first stage, an
individual with an income of E will consume Xi=Di(Pi) of the index of differentiated
9 This point has been suggested by Helpman and Krugman (1989, p. 140) in a similar structure.
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good i (where Di(Pi)=Ei/Pi) and X0 ¼ E 
P
i PiDi Pið Þ of the homogeneous good. It
follows that the indirect utility function can be expressed as:
V P;Eð Þ ¼ E þ S Pð Þ ð7Þ
where P=(P1, P2,. . ., Pn), and S(P)u
P
iUi [Di (Pi )]-
P
iPiDi (Pi ) is the consumer surplus
derived from consumption of the index of the differentiated goods. In the second stage,
with a given expenditure Ei on differentiated good i, the individual will consume a
representative variety of good i produced at home and abroad at the amount of:
xhi ¼ Xi

phi
Pi
ri
¼ Ei
phi
1
mi þ mi4ðsisi4 Þ
1ri ð8Þ
xf i ¼ Xi

pf i
Pi
ri
¼ Ei
pf i
ðsi
si
4 Þ1ri
mi þ mi4ðsisi4 Þ
1ri :
The problem can be solved similarly for differentiated good i in the foreign market,
given the home government’s export policy si and the foreign government’s import policy
si*. With a given expenditure of Ei* on differentiated good i, a foreign individual will
consume a representative home variety xhi* and a representative foreign variety xfi* of good
i according to:
xhi4 ¼ Ei
4
phi4
ðsi4
si
Þ1ri
miðsi4si Þ
1ri þ mi4
ð9Þ
xf i
4 ¼ Ei
4
pf i4
1
miðsi4si Þ
1ri þ mi4
where phi* is the consumer price abroad for a representative home variety of good i. Similar
to Eq. (5), the difference in the consumer prices of the home and foreign varieties at the
foreign market will simply reflect the government interventions in trade: phi4 ¼ si4si pf i4. With
the domestic and foreign market demand for its product combined, a representative home
producer of differentiated good i will produce at the scale of (Nxhi+N*xhi*), where N (N*)
is the total population at home (abroad). Therefore, the aggregate reward to the specific
factor used in producing good i is:
Piðsi; siÞ ¼ miðphi  ciÞðNxhi þ N 4xhi4Þ: ð10Þ
The net revenue from all trade taxes and subsidies, expressed on a per capita basis, is
given by:
R s; sð Þ ¼
Xn
i¼1
mi4ðsi  1Þ phi
si4
xf i  N 4=N
Xn
i¼1
mi

1 1
si

phi xhi
4 ð11Þ
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where s=(s1, s2,. . ., sn), and s=(s1, s2,. . ., sn). It is assumed that the government
redistributes the revenue uniformly to each individual. Therefore, R(s, s) measures the net
government transfer to each individual.
As indicated in Eq. (7), an individual’s welfare depends on his income and the
consumer surplus he derives from the consumption of differentiated goods. A typical
individual’s income includes wages and net government transfers, plus possibly the reward
from the ownership of some sector-specific input. In accordance with the G–H political
framework, claims to the specific inputs are assumed to be indivisible and nontradable,
and individuals each own at most one type of specific factor. In some exogenous set of
sectors, denoted L, the owners of the specific factors have been able to organize
themselves into lobby groups. These lobbies compete noncooperatively for the
government’s favor and propose contribution schedules, Ci(s, s), contingent on the
trade-policy vector set by the government, (s, s), to maximize the joint welfare of their
members. The joint welfare of a lobby i, Vi, is its gross welfare Wi net of the contribution
Ci made to the government. We observe that
Wi s; sð Þ ¼ li þ Pi si;si
 þ aiN R s; sð Þ þ S sð Þ½  ð12Þ
where li is the total labor supply (and also the labor income) of the owners of the specific
input used in industry i and ai is the fraction of the population that owns some of this
specific factor. Note that the domestic consumer surplus is a function of the domestic price
indices of differentiated goods, and is therefore a function of domestic import policies (s).
The domestic export policies (s), on the other hand, do not affect the domestic consumer
surplus in the current framework. Given the contribution schedules offered by the lobby
groups, the government in turn selects a trade-policy vector (s, s) to maximize its
politically motivated objective function, which includes political contributions as well as
general aggregate welfare. Specifically,
G s; sð Þ ¼
X
iaL
Ci s; sð Þ þ aW s; sð Þ az0 ð13Þ
where W is the aggregate, gross-of-contributions welfare and a is the weight that the
government places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions. Aggregate
gross welfare is the sum of aggregate income, net trade tax revenue, and total consumer
surplus. That is,
W s; sð Þ ¼ l þ
Xn
i¼1
Pi si; sið Þ þ N R s; sð Þ þ S sð Þ½ : ð14Þ
3. The structure of protection
With the basic economic and political framework specified, we are ready to derive the
equilibrium structure of protection. I assume that 1þaaLþa brj for all j. This will ensure that
finite solutions for the endogenous import and export policy exist. The explanations will
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be given shortly. As shown in G–H, if the contribution schedules of lobbies are truthful,
the government’s objective function in Eq. (13) is equivalent to:
G˜ s; sð Þ ¼
X
iaL
Wi s; sð Þ þ aW s; sð Þ: ð15Þ
Let us examine in detail the impact of trade policy on the welfare of individual lobbies
and on the country as a whole. First, note that the welfare impact on lobby i of a small
change in sj or sj is:
BWi
Bsj
¼ BPi
Bsj
þaiN

BR
Bsj
þ BS
Bsj

¼dijNmjðphj  cjÞ Bxhj
Bsj
þ aiNmj4ðsj  1Þ phj
sj4
Bxf j
Bsj
; ð16Þ
BWi
Bsj
¼ BPi
Bsj
þaiN BR
Bsj
¼ dijN 4mjðphj  cjÞ Bxhj
4
Bsj
aiN 4mj

1 1
sj

phj
Bxhj4
Bsj
 aiN 4mj phj
s2j
xhj4 ; ð17Þ
where dij is an indicator variable which equals 1 if i=j and 0 otherwise. The first
term in Eq. (16) or (17) measures the effect of a change in sj or sj on lobby i’s welfare as
specific-factor owners, while the rest of the terms measure the effect of the policy
change on lobby i’s welfare as consumers. Eq. (16) indicates that the sum of tariff
revenue and consumer surplus is maximized at the zero import tariff level (sj=1).
10
Therefore, lobby i, who has no claims to the profit in other sectors, would prefer
a zero import tariff for other sectors. This lobbying pattern under monopolistic
competition is different from that in G–H where every lobby desires an import
subsidy for other sectors. The intuition is that in G–H, an import subsidy lowers the
price of the domestic output as well as imports. The specific-factor owners in the
sector where the import subsidy is introduced incur the extra burden of profit loss,
while the remaining citizens end up gaining more in consumer surplus than the
subsidy cost they pay. Thus, unless the import-competing producers are organized,
they will get btaxedQ in this way by the lobbying activities of their organized
neighbors. In the current framework, the price of the domestic output is not affected
by an import subsidy. The gain in consumer surplus for an individual from a small
subsidy is in proportion to his/her share of subsidy cost. No one gains from
deviations from free trade as pure consumers. On the other hand, lobbies as specific-
factor owners would prefer an import tariff for their own sectors. An increase in the
import tariff in sector i raises the consumer price of imported foreign varieties in the
home market, and induces the composition of demand to switch toward the home
varieties. This increases the output of the home varieties and the profit of sector i.
Since the revenue and consumer surplus considerations cancel out at zero import
10 To see this, note that BR
Bsj
þ BS
Bsj
¼ mj4ðsj  1Þ phjsj4
Bxf j
Bsj
f0 if sje1; given that
Bxf j
Bsj
b0:
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tariffs, the profit consideration alone implies that lobby i would prefer a positive
import tariff for its own sector.
Contrary to the import policy, the export policy does not have any bearing on
the domestic consumer surplus. Although the domestic profit is affected by the
export policy, the producer price is not affected by the change in the scale of
production brought about by the change in the export policy. As a result, the
domestic consumer price and consumer surplus are independent of the export policy.
Thus, the revenue effect is the only concern for pure consumers with regard to
export policy. As can be seen in Eq. (17), starting from free trade (sj=1), a small
increase in the export tax increases the revenue.11 Therefore, lobby i would prefer a
positive export tax for other sectors. For its own sector, however, lobby i benefits in profits
from an increase in the export subsidy. An increase in the export subsidy reduces the
consumer price of the home varieties in the foreign market and increases their overseas
market share. This in turn increases the profit of sector i. Overall, depending on the
strength of the profit consideration relative to the revenue consideration, lobby i may
desire an export subsidy or an export tax for its own sector. The smaller the population of
lobby i (ai), the smaller its revenue consideration, and the more likely that it will demand
an export subsidy for its own sector.
For the country as a whole, the effect on aggregate welfare of a small change in sj or sj is:
BW
Bsj
¼ Nmjðphj  cjÞ Bxhj
Bsj
þ Nmj4ðsj  1Þ phj
sj4
Bxf j
Bsj
: ð18Þ
BW
Bsj
¼ N4mjðphj  cjÞ Bxhj
4
Bsj
 N 4mj

1 1
sj

phj
Bxhj
4
Bsj
 N 4mj phj
s2j
xhj
4: ð19Þ
Eq. (18) indicates that the welfare-maximizing import tariff rate is strictly positive.
Starting from zero restrictions on imports (sj=1), the effects of a small tariff
increase on revenue and consumer surplus cancel out. The remaining positive effect
on profits makes a tariff desirable. This result is consistent with those of Gros
(1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987), who show that the optimal tariff is strictly
positive for a monopolistically competitive industry in a small country. For the
export policy, Eq. (19) indicates that starting with zero restrictions on exports (sj=1),
a small increase in sj has both a positive effect and a negative effect on national
welfare. It increases the profit of industry j, but at the same time, increases the
country’s subsidy payment. As will be shown later, however, the welfare-maximizing
export policy is in fact an export tax. In contrast with the G–H model where the
benchmark welfare-maximizing policy is free trade for all sectors under perfect
competition, we have positive import tariffs and export taxes as the benchmark
welfare-maximizing policies under monopolistic competition.
11 To see this, note that BR
Bsj
¼  aiN 4mjphjxhj4 b0 at sj ¼ 1:
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Combining lobby interests and national interests, we obtain the effect of a small
change in sj on the government’s political welfare as:
BG˜
Bsj
¼ ðIj þ aÞNmjðphj  cjÞ Bxhj
Bsj
þ ðaL þ aÞNmj4ðsj  1Þ phj
sj4
Bxf j
Bsj
¼ ðIj þ aÞ 1rj Nmjphj
Bxhj
Bsj
 ðaL þ aÞ zjrj þ 1
zjðrj  1Þ
sj  1
sj
Nmjphj
Bxhj
Bsj
; ð20Þ
where Ij=RiaLdij is an indicator variable that equals 1 if industry j is organized and 0
otherwise, aL=RiaLai is the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby,
and zju
mj
mj4
ð sj
sj4
Þrj1 ¼ mjphjxhj
mj4pf jxf j
is the market share of domestic products relative to the
market share of foreign products at the tax-included price in the home market.12 On the
other hand, the impact of a small change in sj on the government’s political welfare is:
BG˜
Bsj
¼ Ij þ a
 
N 4mj phj  cj
  Bxhj4
Bsj
 aL þ að ÞN 4mj

1 1
sj

phj
Bxhj4
Bsj
 aL þ að ÞN 4mj phj
s2j
xhj4
¼ Ij þ a
  1
rj
N 4mjphj
Bxhj4
Bsj
 aL þ að Þ
	
1 rj
sj

rj þ 1zj4
 þ 1


N 4mjphj
Bxhj4
Bsj
: ð21Þ
where zj4u
mj4
mj
ðsj4
sj
Þrj1 ¼ mj4pf j4 xf j4
mj phj4 xhj4
is the market share of foreign products relative to the
market share of domestic products at the tax-included price in the foreign market.13
Notice in Eq. (20) that lim
sjY0
zjrjþ1
zj rj1ð Þ
sj1
sj
¼ l and that lim
sjYl
zjrjþ1
zjðrj1Þ
sj1
sj
¼ rjrj1. Thus,
finite solutions for the endogenous import policy exist if ðIj þ aÞ 1rj bðaL þ aÞ
rj
rj1. On
the other hand, observe in Eq. (21) that lim
sjY0
f 1rj
sjðrjþ1=zj4Þ þ 1g ¼ l and that
lim
sjYl
 1rj
sjðrjþ1=zj4Þ þ 1
 ¼ 1. Thus, finite solutions for the endogenous export policy exist
if ðIj þ aÞ 1rj bðaL þ aÞ. The assumption made earlier that 1þaaLþa brj for all j guarantees that
both of these conditions are satisfied, and therefore that finite solutions for the endogenous
import and export policies exist.
Suppose (so,so) is the equilibrium trade policy. Then (so,so) must satisfy the
first-order and second-order conditions: BG˜
Bsj
so; soÞ ¼ 0ð , B2G˜
Bs2
j
so; soÞb0ð , BG˜
Bsj
so; soÞ ¼ 0ð ,
12 To derive Eq. (20), note that given the definition of z j , we can rewrite Eq. (8) as
xhj ¼ Ejphj
zj
zjþ1ð Þmj and xf j ¼ xhjð
sj
sj4
Þrj . Given this, we can further show that Bxhj
Bsj
¼ rj1ð Þ
sj zjþ1ð Þ xhj and
Bxf j
Bsj
¼
 zjrjþ1rj1 ð
sj
sj4
Þrj Bxhj
Bsj
.
13 To derive Eq. (21), note that given the definition of zj4, we can rewrite xhj* in Eq. (9) as xhj

 ¼ Ej

pf j


zj4
mj4 zj4þ1ð Þsj4
sj
rj
and show that
Bxhj4
Bsj
¼ rj zj4þ1
sj zj4þ1ð Þ xhj4.
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and B
2G˜
Bs2
j
so; soÞb0ð for j=1, 2,. . ., n. The following proposition summarizes the
findings.
Proposition 1 (Endogenous protection structure). If the contribution schedules of the
lobbies are truthful, then the import policy that will emerge in the political equilibrium
must satisfy the first-order condition14
soj  1
soj
¼ Ij þ a
aL þ a
rj1
rj
rj þ 1zo
j
for j ¼ 1; 2; N ; n; ð22Þ
and the second-order condition
soj
zoj þ 1
b
rj
rj  1 for j ¼ 1; 2; N ; n: ð23Þ
On the other hand, the equilibrium export policy must satisfy the first-order condition15
soj ¼
rj  1
rj  IjþaaLþa
rj
rj þ 1z4o
j
for j ¼ 1; 2; N ; n: ð24Þ
The second-order condition automatically holds at sj=sj
o. In the above equations,
z
o
j ¼ mjphjx
o
hj
mj4p of j x
o
f j
is the equilibrium market share of domestic products relative to the market
share of foreign products at the tax-included price in the home market, and z4oj ¼ mj4pf j4x
o
f j
4
mjp
o
hj
4 x
o
hj
4
is the equilibrium market share of foreign products relative to the market share of domestic
products at the tax-included price in the foreign market.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is given in Appendix A. 5
Recall that the producer price (and hence the terms of trade) is fixed in the current
framework. This implies that the import and export policies are strategically independent.
Thus, they can be derived separately from Eqs. (20) and (21). To verify this, note that
zoj ¼ mjmj4
 soj
sj4
rj1
and z4
o
j ¼ mj
4
mj
 sj4
so
j
rj1. Therefore, the import policy sjo in Eq. (22) and the export
policy sj
o in Eq. (24) are indeed mutually independent.
Next, notice that the second-order condition automatically holds at the equilibrium export
policy that satisfies the first-order condition, in contrast with the import policy. This
asymmetry arises from the fact that unlike the import policy, the export policy does not affect
the domestic consumer surplus. The import and export policies have similar influences on
the producer interest through the scale effect. But their influences on the consumer interest
are not symmetric. While an import policy produces conflicting effects on revenue and
14 Note that given the definition of import policy s j in the current paper,
soj 1
so
j
in Proposition 1 corresponds to
the expression
toj
1þto
j
in Proposition 2 of Grossman and Helpman (1994) when applied to import-competing
industries.
15 The solution for the equilibrium export policy, if expressed in the same way as the import policy, is
soj 1
so
j
¼
IjaL
aLþa
rj1 
rj IjþaaLþa
rj1
1
rj z
o
j
4
. Since this expression is significantly more complicated, while the implications are the
same, I choose to present the export policy in the simpler format sj
o.
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consumer surplus, an export policy’s revenue effect is not countered by any consumer
surplus concern. Observe that in Eq. (21), the term aL þ að Þ
n
1rj
sjðrjþ1=zj
Þ þ 1
o
is monotonically
increasing in sj, while the term
ðIjþaÞ
rj
is constant. Thus, the first-order condition for the
export policy BG˜
Bsj
¼ 0 has a unique solution, which is also the maximizer. On the other hand,
in Eq. (20), the term zjrjþ1
zjðrj1Þ
sj1
sj
is not necessarily monotonically increasing in sj. The first-
order condition for the import policy BG˜
Bsj
¼ 0 has potentially multiple solutions. The second-
order condition in Eq. (23) helps identify the local maxima at which the term zjrjþ1
zjðrj1Þ
sj1
sj
is
increasing locally. Note that in Eq. (23), 1
zo
j
þ1 is the equilibrium market share of foreign
products in the home market, and
rj
rj1 is the degree of monopoly power of a representative
firm in sector j. Thus, the second-order condition for the import policy in Eq. (23) says that
at the equilibrium, the import policy sj
o multiplied by the market share of foreign products
in sector j should be smaller than the degree of monopoly power of a representative firm in
sector j.
I proceed now to discuss the endogenous protection pattern under monopolistic
competition. First, Proposition 1 implies that the welfare-maximizing trade policy under
monopolistic competition is an import tariff and an export tax for each sector. Note that
the welfare-maximizing trade policy can be regarded as a special case of the endogenous
trade policy when the government is not politically motivated. This is equivalent to
setting aL=0 and Ij=0 for all j in the endogenous trade policy equations (22) and (24).
The import policy equation becomes
soj 1
so
j
¼ ðrj1Þ=rjrjþ1=zoj , which is strictly positive, given that
rjN1 and that mj,mj*p 0. Thus, the welfare-maximizing import tariff is positive. This
confirms our earlier observations in Eq. (18) regarding the aggregate welfare impact of an
import policy change. On the other hand, when the government is not politically
motivated, the export policy equation reduces to s
o
j ¼ rjrjþ1=z4oj , which is strictly less than 1.
By the definition of sj, this implies an export tax. As indicated in Eq. (19), starting with
zero restrictions on exports, an export tax has both a positive and negative impact on
national welfare. The result here suggests that the positive effect of a small increase in the
export tax on revenue outweighs the negative effect on profits. Thus, a small export tax is
welfare improving.
Second, Proposition 1 indicates that lobby influences induce the government to
increase the protection level in organized sectors, and decrease the protection level in
unorganized sectors, compared to the welfare-maximizing (import tariff and export tax)
level.16 Compare Eq. (16) with Eq. (18), or Eq. (17) with Eq. (19). We observe that
lobby j would want a higher protection level than the benchmark welfare-maximizing
level for sector j, because the profit consideration is relatively stronger. On the other
hand, the lobbies of other sectors would want lower protection for sector j, because
they do not receive any profit from sector j. Overall, the lobbies together work to
promote higher protection for organized sectors and lower protection for unorganized
sectors. Weighing the lobby interest against the general interest, the government then
sets the endogenous trade policies such that they lie in between the welfare-
maximizing level and the higher protection level desired by the lobbies for organized
16 To see this, note that in Eq. (22),
Ijþa
aLþa N1 if Ij ¼ 1; and
Ijþa
aLþa b1 if Ij ¼ 0; similarly in Eq. (24),rj1
rj Ijþað Þ= aLþað Þ N1 if Ij ¼ 1; and
rj1
rj Ijþað Þ= aLþað Þ b1 if Ij ¼ 0.
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sectors, and in-between the welfare-maximizing level and the lower protection level
desired by the lobbies for unorganized sectors.
Notice that the lower bounds on import tariffs, which are what lobbies desire for
unorganized sectors, are zero. Thus, the endogenous import tariff for unorganized sectors
will never fall below zero. On the other hand, the upper bounds on export policy, which are
what lobbies desire for organized sectors, can be an export tax. Thus, it is possible that the
endogenous export policy for organized sectors is an export tax. Whether the endogenous
export policy for organized sectors will be an export tax or export subsidy depends on the
relative strength of the revenue consideration versus the profit consideration by the lobbies
and the government. An export subsidy is likely to emerge in organized sectors, if the lobbies
are a small fraction of the total population and the government is strongly biased toward
lobby interests. These findings are different from the G–H result where the unorganized
import-competing sector always faces an import subsidy, whereas the organized export
sector always receives an export subsidy.
Third, Proposition 1 indicates a positive (negative) association between the market share
of the domestic products and the import (export) protection level, in either organized or
unorganized sectors. Given the intraindustry trade structure, let us re-define the bimport
penetrationQ of an industry as the market share of foreign products relative to the market
share of domestic products at the tax-included price in the home market. This corresponds
to 1
zo
j
in Eq. (22) and is negatively correlated with the endogenous import policy sj
o in both
organized and unorganized sectors. Thus, a sector with higher import penetration receives
lower import protection, regardless of whether the sector is politically represented or not.
This is contrary to the G–H model, where the relationship between the import penetration
and the import protection level differs between organized and unorganized sectors. In G–H,
organized sectors with higher import penetration will receive lower protection, but
unorganized sectors with higher import penetration will receive higher protection (or more
precisely, less negative protection). This difference in findings may be reconciled by the
fact that both organized and unorganized sectors are protected by import tariffs in the
current study. In this case, the effect of the size of the domestic industry is similar to that in
G–H for organized industries, which receive positive import tariffs. In sectors with a larger
presence of domestic firms, the gain in profits from an import tariff is relatively larger,
while the loss in consumer surplus net of tariff revenue is relatively smaller. This leads to
higher levels of tariff protection for sectors with lower import penetration.
Contrary to the positive effect of market share on the import protection that a sector will
receive, a sector with a larger market share in the foreign market will receive less protection
on its exports. To see this, note that a sector with higher bexport penetration,Q as represented
by 1
z
o
j
in Eq. (24), receives lower export subsidies (or incurs higher export taxes), regardless
of the state of the industry’s political organization. The intuition is that the size of exports
has a first-order effect on tax revenue while it has only a secondary effect on profits. When
an export tax is introduced in sectors with a larger export market, the gain from tax
revenue over the loss in profits is relatively larger than in sectors with a smaller export
market. In the case of an export subsidy, the cost of subsidy payment over the gain from
profits is relatively larger in sectors with a larger export market than in sectors with a
smaller one. Thus, the export tax would be higher, or the export subsidy would be lower,
in sectors with higher export market shares.
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Proposition 2 (Comparative statics). The political and economic parameters of the
economy have the following effects on the endogenous protection levels (so,so):
ðiÞ Bs
o
j
Ba
N0 if Ij ¼ 0 and
Bsoj
Ba
b0 if Ij¼ 1;
Bsoj
BaL
b0;
Bsoj
Bmj
N0;
Bsoj
Bmj4
b0;
for j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n;
ðiiÞ Bs
o
j
Ba
N0 if Ij ¼ 0 and
Bsoj
Ba
b0 if Ij ¼ 1;
Bsoj
BaL
b0;
Bsoj
Bmj
b0;
Bsoj
Bmj4
N0;
for j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n;
Proof of Proposition 2. The derivations are given in Appendix A. 5
Proposition 2 indicates that as the government places more weight on aggregate welfare
relative to campaign contributions, the endogenous protection levels increase in
unorganized sectors and decrease in organized sectors. As the parameter a becomes large,
the endogenous protection levels in both organized and unorganized sectors approach the
benchmark welfare-maximizing protection levels.17 In other words, the more the
government is concerned about aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions,
the smaller are the deviations of the endogenous trade policies from the welfare-
maximizing levels. This property also holds in G–H, with the welfare-maximizing levels
being free trade instead of import tariffs and export taxes.
Proposition 2 also says that the endogenous protection levels in all sectors decrease
with the fraction of population that is politically represented. Parallel results can be found
in G–H. As the lobby members become negligible in number (aL=0), they care little about
the trade policy in other sectors. In the unorganized sectors (Ij=0), the government’s
concern for general welfare is not countered by special interests, so the welfare-
maximizing protection levels prevail in these sectors. On the other hand, when every voter
belongs to some interest group (aL=1) and all industries are organized, the demand of an
organized lobby (Ij=1) for a higher protection level above the welfare-maximizing level
for its sector is exactly offset in equilibrium by the bids of all other lobbies to lower the
protection level below the welfare-maximizing level for the sector. As a result, the
protection for all sectors will reduce to the benchmark levels.18
In the situation of monopolistic competition, new parameters regarding the numbers of
domestic and foreign firms in the industries are introduced. Proposition 2 indicates that the
number of domestic firms in an industry has a positive effect on the import protection
level, but has a negative effect on the export protection level. The number of foreign firms
18 To see this, note that in Eqs. (22) and (24), when Ij ¼ aL ¼ 0 or 1; IjþaaLþa ¼ 1 and
rj1
rj IjþaaLþa
¼ 1.
17 To see this, note that in Eq. (22),
Ijþa
a
L
þaY1; as aYl; similarly, in Eq. (24),
rj1
rj Ijþaa
L
þa
Y1; as aYl.
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has exactly the opposite effect. This result is consistent with the earlier observations
regarding import/export penetration. An industry with more domestic firms or fewer
foreign firms has lower import penetration. The profit gain from tariffs is relatively larger
as the number of domestic firms increases, while the loss in consumer surplus net of tariff
revenue is relatively smaller as the number of foreign firms decreases. Therefore,
endogenous import tariffs are higher in industries with lower import penetration. This is
true regardless of the industry being politically represented or not. On the other hand, an
industry with more domestic firms or fewer foreign firms has higher export penetration
and will receive less protection on its exports. This applies to both organized and
unorganized industries.
A final parameter of interest is the elasticity of substitution among the home and foreign
varieties rj, which is also the approximate elasticity of import demand and of export
supply. Unlike G–H, where a negative association exists between the elasticity (in absolute
value) and the deviation from the welfare-maximizing policy, no such definite relationship
is found in the current framework with monopolistic competition.
4. Conclusion
This paper incorporates the Krugman–Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition frame-
work into the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is to account
for the prevalence of intraindustry trade and to examine the endogenous structure of
protection that will emerge under the alternative trade structure. Explicit formulas for the
endogenous import and export policy are derived, which provide clear predictions of cross-
sectoral protection patterns.
Several new results arise in this paper. First, the endogenous import tariff in
unorganized sectors will never fall below zero. This is contrary to the G–H prediction
that unorganized import-competing sectors will face import subsidies. Second, the
endogenous export policy for organized sectors can be an export tax or an export subsidy,
depending on the degree of lobby representation and the government’s concern for general
welfare. In G–H, organized export sectors always receive export subsidies. Third, the
current paper predicts an inverse relation between import penetration and levels of import
protection, regardless of whether a sector is politically organized or not. This deviates from
the G–H result where the relation between import penetration and import protection is
negative if the import-competing sector is organized, and is positive if the sector is
unorganized. The difference in findings between the current paper and the G–H paper
suggests that the endogenous protection structure varies with the nature of the industry
(competitive or monopolistically competitive). Thus, a properly designed empirical
framework based on the G–H-type model should allow for heterogeneous responses of
protection to the underlying political/economic factors across different market structures.
There are some fruitful directions in which the current paper may be extended. Notice
that the results of the current study rely on two simplifying assumptions, which may be
relaxed to yield new insights. First, the producer price (and hence the terms of trade) is
fixed given the production and consumption structure of the model. It follows that the
export policy does not affect the domestic consumer price and consumer surplus. This
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implies that import and export policies are strategically independent. Second, the
demand and supply of an industry depend only on the price in its own industry, and not
on prices in other industries. Hence, industry lobbyists are interested in the trade policy
of other sectors only as consumers, and not as producers (this second assumption
follows the original G–H model). If the above assumptions are relaxed to allow for
import and export policy substitution and sectoral interactions, it is possible that the
conclusions about the export policy will change, especially the result that exports of
unorganized sectors will be charged export taxes, which are not common in practice.
These generalizations form part of the agenda for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs for the propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Given Eq. (20), the desired result in Eq. (22) follows
immediately by the first-order condition that BG˜
Bsj
¼ 0 at sj ¼ soj . The equilibrium import
policy must also satisfy the second-order condition that B
2G˜
Bs2
j
b0 at sj ¼ soj , such that sjo
identifies a relative maximum instead of minimum. Given Eq. (20), it is straightforward to
show that
B
2G˜
Bs2j
¼

Ij þ a
  1
rj
 aL þ að Þ zjrj þ 1
zj rj  1
  sj  1
sj

Nmjphj
B
2xhj
Bs2j
 aL þ a
s2j
 rj þ 1zj
rj  1 
sj  1
zj

Nmjphj
Bxhj
Bsj
: ð25Þ
Note that the terms in the first bracket equal to zero, when evaluated at sj=sj
o, by the first-
order condition. It follows that the second-order condition holds if and only if
rjþ1=zoj
rj1 
soj 1
zo
j
N0; or equivalently;
soj
z0
j
þ1 b
rj
rj1.
Given Eq. (21), the desired result in Eq. (24) follows by the first-order condition that
BG˜
Bsj
¼ 0 at sj ¼ soj . Again, the equilibrium export policy must also satisfy the second-order
condition that B
2G˜
Bs2
j
b0 at sj ¼ soj . Using Eq. (21), we can show that
B
2G˜
Bs2j
¼

Ij þ a
  1
rj
 aL þ að Þ

1 rj
sj

rj þ 1zj4Þ
þ 1

N4mjphj
B
2xhj4
Bs2j
 aL þ að Þ
rj  1
 
rj þ 1zj4

zj4þ 1
s2j zj4

rj þ 1zj4Þ
2
N4mjphj
Bxhj4
Bsj
: ð26Þ
When evaluated at sj=sj
o, the terms in the bracket equal to zero by the first-order
condition, while the terms after the minus sign are positive. It follows that the second-
order condition automatically holds at sj=sj
o. 5
Proof of Proposition 2. Take the total differentiation of the import tariff equation (22)
with respect to sj
o and a, and use the fact that Bzj
Bsj
¼ rj1sj zj. It is straightforward to show that
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Bsoj
Ba
¼ aLIj
aLþað Þ2 ðs
o2
j z
o
j Þ=ð rjrj1 
soj
zo
j
þ1Þ. Similarly, take the total differentiation of the import tariff
equation (22) with respect to sj
o and aL, we can show that
Bsoj
BaL
¼  Ijþa
aLþað Þ2 ðs
o2
j z
o
j Þ=ð rjrj1 
soj
zo
j
þ1Þ.
Note also that Bzj
Bmj
¼ zj
mj
and
Bzj
Bmj4
¼  zj
mj4
. Apply this and take the total differentiation of
Eq. (22) with respect to sj
o and mj (or mj*), we have that
Bsoj
Bmj
¼ IjþaaLþa 1mj rj zoj þ1ð Þ ðs
o2
j z
o
j Þ=
rj
rj1 
soj
zo
j
þ1
 
and that
Bsoj
Bmj4
¼  IjþaaLþa 1mj4 rjzoj þ1ð Þ ðs
o2
j z
o
j Þ=ð rjrj1 
soj
zo
j
þ1 Þ. The desired result (i) in
Proposition 2 follows immediately by the second-order condition (23).
The comparative statics analysis for the export policy can be carried out analogously.
First, note that
Bzj4
Bsj
¼  rj1
sj
zj4;
Bzj4
Bmj
¼  zj4
mj
; and
Bzj4
Bmj4
¼ zj4
mj4
. Use these results and take
the total differentiation of the export policy equation (24) with respect to sj
o and the
parameter under study. It is straightforward to show that
Bso
j
Ba
¼ aLIjðaLþaÞ2
zj4
o
zj4
oþ1 ðrj  1Þ=ðrj 
Ijþa
aLþa Þ
2.
We can further derive that
Bsoj
BaL
¼  IjþaðaLþaÞ2
zj4
o
zj4
oþ1 ðrj  1Þ=ðrj 
Ijþa
aLþa Þ
2
,
Bsoj
Bmj
¼  1
mj
1
ðrjþ1=zj4oÞðzj4oþ1Þ
ðrj  1Þ=ðrj  IjþaaLþa Þ, and
Bso
j
Bmj4
¼ 1
mj4
1
ðrjþ1=zj4oÞðzj4oþ1Þ ðrj  1Þ=ðrj 
Ijþa
aLþa Þ. The desired result (ii) in
Proposition 2 follows by the assumption that 1þaaLþa brj. 5
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